Missouri Law Review
Volume 86

Issue 2

Article 12

Spring 2021

The Myth of Eternal Return and the Politics of Judicial Review
Samuel Moyn

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Samuel Moyn, The Myth of Eternal Return and the Politics of Judicial Review, 86 MO. L. REV. ()
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss2/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Moyn: The Myth of Eternal Return and the Politics of Judicial Review

The Myth of Eternal Return and the Politics
of Judicial Review
Samuel Moyn*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS...................................................................................571
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................572
II. CYCLES ..................................................................................................573
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW .................................................................................577
IV. HOPE AND OPTIMISM ............................................................................580

* Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence and Professor of History, Yale
University.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [], Art. 12

572

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

I. INTRODUCTION
“Some people see in all earthly things only a dreary cyclical movement,”
Heinrich Heine wrote around 1833.1 “In contrast to the fatal and indeed
fatalistic view,” he added, “there is a brighter view, more closely related to
the idea of providence.”2 As Heine described it, from this alternative
perspective “all earthly things are maturing towards a beautiful state of
perfection . . . a higher, godlike condition of the human race, whose moral and
political struggles will at last lead to the holiest peace, the purest brotherhood,
and the most everlasting happiness.”3
Constitutionalism is an ancient idea, albeit one long associated with the
form of regimes in general rather than self-governance under written charters
that lay down fundamental law.4 As such, constitutionalism began its life
linked to “dreary cyclical” stories of rise and decline, improvement and
decadence, splendor and ruin.5 In doing so, it repurposed archaic thinking
from even earlier to descry the direction of constitutional politics. But modern
constitutionalism, especially the neo-providentialist form that many
Americans have learned to associate with self-governance under a written
document, is not the same as the archaic or the ancient. It works with a
dualism of fundamental and ordinary law that owes its sources to Christian
theology, making it difficult for any Americans to embrace fully the stories of
proud ascendancy and inevitable fall in which the archaic imagination and
then ancient Greeks and Romans trafficked so long.
At first glance, Jack Balkin’s sparkling new book, The Cycles of
Constitutional Time, seems to be about a revival of cyclical thinking familiar
to the ancients amid some sort of ongoing commitment to progressive
redemption that the moderns brought online.6 But it turns out that it is defined
less by an ancient dreariness than by a cautious optimism. In this reflection
on Balkin’s argument, I wonder if we need to go further for the sake that
optimism, and therefore break more thoroughly with the analytical and moral
premises of the ancient framework he adopts.
There is no doubt that Balkin converts his master concept of cycles from
the basis for blind guesses and soothsaying prognostications that repetitionminded premoderns indulged into a sense of probable regularities boasting the
authority of contemporary political “science.” But I nonetheless want to
1. HEINRICH HEINE, THE HARZ JOURNEY AND SELECTED PROSE 195 (Ritchie
Robertson ed. and trans., 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 195–96.
4. See generally CHARLES H. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT
AND MODERN (1947).
5. HEINE, supra note 1 at 195.
6. JACK BALKIN, THE CYCLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME 3–4 (2020).
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express some restlessness regarding the cyclical modeling and
prognosticating goals of Balkin’s new book before turning to focus a few
skeptical remarks on his account of judicial review.
Oddly, Balkin’s story about judicial review has some features that prove
the distinctive originality of our moment, but it also treats judicial review itself
as in some sense outside the regularities of cycles or the possibility of greater
progress alike.7 I want to put maximum analytical and normative pressure on
how hard a constraint Balkin makes the sort of judicial authority America has
consecrated, in a moment when more and more Americans are taking a second
look at it. Examining what Balkin says, I will reach for the conclusion that
optimism requires a rather different account of the past and future of judicial
review – and the country itself.

II. CYCLES
On inspection, The Cycles of Constitutional Time is actually three nearly
separate books.8 One is indeed about cycles, exploring how to generate a story
of American constitutional regimes from Stephen Skowronek’s influential
extrapolation from history of the rise and fall of presidential regimes.9 And
following Skowronek, Balkin presents the main cycle of American
constitutional history as having various intermediate points, as an arc that
seems to head one direction bends back towards the beginning in a series of
stages.10 The other two books – on polarization and rot – are not about cycles,
exactly.11 If they are, they concern circles collapsed into lines with two
endpoints.12 They are, that is, about oscillations.13 Polarization waxes and
wanes, and rot increases until renovation is necessary, before rot sets in
again.14 In these latter two cases, there is, so far as I can tell, no attempt to
build a theory of oscillation between two points into a theory of circular
movement on a path with identifiable stages.
Balkin’s investigation of his dynamics is actually three because it is
organized as separate inquiries.15 The book is itself organized as two cycles,
first proceeding through each dynamic on its own then repeating the drill to

7. Id. at 69–71.
8. Id. at 6.
9. Id. at 13 (citing STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE:
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON (1997)).
10. Id. at 13–19.
11. Id. at 6.
12. Id. at 6–7.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 30, 63.
15. Id. at 6.
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theorize judicial review.16 (As I will argue below, some crucial relaxation of
Balkin’s separation of the dynamics occurs, but only in the book’s second
half.) True, the combination of books is amply justified by the repeated
assertion that America right now is in a particular place within each story. But
again, as far as I could tell, there is no deeper attempt to correlate the
dynamics,17 to explain whether the three always track one another, or whether
to treat the current perfect storm – the brink of a new regime with
extraordinary polarization and advanced rot – as explicable or stochastic. The
intelligible patterns that Balkin attempts to discern appear within each
dynamic rather than among them.
None of these observations is meant to be critical, only to describe my
understanding of Balkin’s enterprise, and to prepare the ground for placing it
in a particular tradition. Of the book’s ambition, there is no doubt. It marshals
very different political science literatures in its three parts in order – a
literature on regimes supplemented by one on the political foundations of
judicial review in the first part, a literature on polarization in the second, and
a literature pondering the death of democracy in the third – to apply them to
constitutional phenomena in what is supposed to be not an ad hoc response to
our moment but a systemic and unified account of how American history
works.
In many ways, it is a heroic enterprise. But what most deeply unites
Balkin’s three-books-in-one, aside from the common assertion that the present
is a fateful moment in all trajectories, is a strikingly naturalistic imaginary.
Cycles are what planets do, polarization – I believe – comes from wave
theory, and decrepitude and rot are the fate of living things, not human
political communities that endure in intergenerational projects of precisely the
kind constitutions are supposed to allow. Balkin’s naturalistic metaphors in
this book are revealing, I want to suggest. They represent the clearest legacy
of a premodern mentality in thinking about history and politics, which may
compromise his attempt to wrest a shred of optimism from the jaws of fate.
The search for cyclical patterns in history, even more than the other
natural dynamics Balkin revives, is a classic irrationality that goes all the way
back.18 Anthropologist Mircea Eliade famously claimed in Cosmos and
History: The Myth of Eternal Return that the “archaic mind” works by seeing

16. Id. at 3–154.
17. Of course, the account of rot incorporates that of polarization by
reference since the latter is one of the “four horsemen of constitutional rot.” Id. at
49. But unless I missed an earlier instance, Balkin first suggests polarization and
rot (if not necessarily then “usually”) come together rather late in the book. Id. at
135.
18. BALKIN, supra note 6, at 5.
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what are actually novel events as a matter of “archetypes” and “repetition.”19
In such consciousness, the eternal return functioned at the cosmic level, and
among puny humans as part of the universal processes.20 And Eliade therefore
thought the problem was identifying how fateful it was that, in response to
difficulties in experience, moderns who had once resolved to “consciously
and voluntarily creat[e] history” sometimes renounced that goal by reviving
mythological frameworks.21 “The reappearance of cyclical theories in
contemporary thought,” Eliade worried skeptically, long before Balkin took
his turn, “is pregnant with meaning.”22
The Greco-Roman legacy in theories of “recurrence” proved equally
massive.23 As Balkin notes, the Greek historian Polybius, writing in the
Hellenistic period, propounded the most renowned classical account of
circular stages.24 A bit less mythological and a bit more secular than archaic
irrationality, and profoundly influential on America’s founders, Polybian and
other cyclical theories of ancient politics died out in part because they denied
human freedom and explained too little about what allows for similarity in
widely divergent settings.
Though not in exactly the same way, there are similar premodern roots
to Balkin’s neo-republican story of “rot.” It is reminiscent of a long-standing
genre of decadence and renewal only slightly newer than cycles, which has
been revived almost as often as cyclical history over the centuries. Often
deployed to think through Roman decline, it was useful for those anxious for
the fate of many later polities. In fact, very often over the centuries of
Polybius’s influence, the go-to grid of decadence and renewal was embedded
within the theory of cyclical recurrence, and it is interesting that Balkin hives
it off as a potentially separate phenomenon to explain the American
experience.25
Regardless, the gambit of Balkin’s book is that we can retain the
analytical and especially the predictive uses of old mythologies of natural
dynamics in human politics by regrounding them in the framework of current
political science. He disclaims any reliance on literal repetition in favor of a
theory of “rhyming.”26 But in fact, for Balkin’s enterprise to be plausible, he
has to assume that the cycles and oscillations he charts do have real causal
19. MIRCEA ELIADE, COSMOS AND HISTORY: THE MYTH OF ETERNAL
RETURN 147 (Willard R. Trask trans. 1959).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 141.
22. Id. at 147.
23. G.W. TROMPF, THE IDEA OF HISTORICAL RECURRENCE IN WESTERN
THOUGHT: FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE RENAISSANCE (1979).
24. Balkin, supra note 6, at 5.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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foundations that allow sufficiently like situations to recur, because otherwise
both the analytical and predictive uses of the scheme fall away.
I am not entirely sure what justifies this crucial last assumption,
especially given the risks it imposes. Balkin cryptically acknowledges the
need for some justification: “People cause these cycles,” he remarks in the
closest gesture to deep theory in the book, “the mobilization, organization,
and the exercise of political will in a particular institutional environment.”27
I infer that, while Balkin accepts the characteristically modern belief that
history is whatever humans make it, somehow, and for unexplained reasons,
they end up doing similar things over and over in relation to institutions they
have built. There is no account, however, of why freedom ends up falling into
ruts. Balkin insists that – notwithstanding the excellent cover-image of the
book – “[p]olitics is not astronomy.”28 But he still affirms that things “tend
to cycle in intelligible ways.”29 Why does that happen?
Only if there really is something to recurrence does the book make sense,
and Balkin clearly believes there is. He is dealing with real phenomena, even
if nowhere in the book is there a deep accounting for why such patterns can
obtain across time. Presumably Balkin thinks that, even if the eternal return
of the same does not function with the deep foundations that some have
supposed, in some histories – like American constitutional history – there are
factors that lead to determination, in an ongoing institutional history that
remains continuous across difference, constraining whatever freedom actors
have to tweak their fate. Within each dynamic, to be sure, there is more to go
on. As Skowronek described, within a bipartisan system there will be various
handoffs of long-term power as parties (more precisely, the presidents who
lead them) establish long-term hegemony.30 But notably, Balkin does not ever
really stress that freedom can consist in escaping patterns.
It was clearly worth a try for Balkin to develop these assumptions, and
the results illuminate a lot. There is so much in the framework that is
interesting and striking on which I have not wasted my words. But somehow
– for me at least – the results still bear too many worrisome hallmarks of
premodern attempts to read the signs of the times. Such accounts offer insight
but risk two distortions in particular. They have a difficult time dealing with
new situations and original moves, and suppress both by transforming them
into recurrence and repetition. Analytically, they reverse engineer logics to
explain contingency in real time as necessity after the fact.31 Prescriptively,
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id. at 6.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 13–14 (citing SKOWRONEK, supra note 9).
31. One especially interesting example, because it involves a failure of selfreference, is Balkin’s own placement of his trajectory in the story. He reports that
his current “living originalist” strategy was one among many ways liberals
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they offer hope, if it is available at all, within the terms of recurrence, rather
than in the possibility of fuller novelty.
In both respects, Balkin’s stories share the trademark sin of the
premodern past: they are about qualifying or even renouncing freedom. This
is especially true when whatever determination is associated with quasinatural processes is revealed to be far weaker than otherwise because their
triple convergence – as now – gives rise to an unprecedented situation that no
longer rhymes with the past. As I want to show next, Balkin’s story of judicial
review verges on portraying just that kind of distinctive moment right now.

III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Balkin’s engagement with how judicial review figures in the three
dynamics is wonderful all the way through, and taught this amateur a great
deal about how admiration for and criticism of judicial review tracks the cycle
of constitutional regimes. Equally interesting is Balkin’s exploration of
polarization and rot, and their effects both on the functions of judicial review
and on theories about its uses. His predictions are powerful, and might even
be right. But it is possible that Balkin’s framework both concedes too much
to the durability of judicial review in the first place, and misses the unique
features of our moment on Balkin’s own account.
Start with how Balkin sees our present. Balkin’s constitutional regimes
story suggests that America is on the brink of a new one, which – on its own
– does plausibly justify the inference that liberals currently calling more and
more plaintively for judicial restraint will move to embrace judicial power as
soon as they dominate.32 But the polarization and rot stories, which crucially
turn out to be companions, have collapsed the credibility of judicial politics at
the end of their cycles. So there is not just the fact that, within the tales of
polarization and rot, judicial review is powerless to negate the extreme
situation within each dynamic. Rather, for that very reason, it is hard to
understand why judicial review would play its expected role should
progressives found a new constitutional regime. The unique moment coming

responded to the erosion of their side’s capture of the judiciary in the middle of
the twentieth century, without mentioning his origins as a “crit” and defender not
of liberalism but rather of “transcendent justice.” See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Being Just
with Deconstruction, 3 SOC. AND LEGAL STUDIES 393 (1994).
32. Perhaps because the generational arguments on which Balkin relies put
me in a different place, I read the liberal trajectory as less about the relinquishment
of investment in judicial review than about its preservation, in part for the sake of
the institutional and public authority of constitutional scholarship, and the main
puzzle from where I sit is why it took so long for the credibility of politics through
constitutional judges to endure as an organizing proposition. BALKIN, supra note
6, at 27.
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or starting, in other words, seems on Balkin’s own account to be one in which
progressives will face the temptation to re-embrace judicial review after a bout
of skepticism when the political supports for it have been polarized and rotted
away. This is not something that has happened before. Why, then, assume
the cycle of regimes will stick to type?
Balkin starts the judicial review section of his book with a chapter that
generalizes about the topic, rather than delving into one cycle or another.33 In
particular, Balkin offers some compelling reasons for the endurance and
growth of political supports for judicial review across time.34 Balkin
independently supposes that judicial review is desirable, a proposition he does
not defend, especially with arguments about the intrusive and strong form
Americans developed (and the rest of the world rejects).35 But – in the
traditions of public law theory in political science – he believes that regardless
of its moral importance, judicial power always grows, in part because
politicians have good strategic reasons to transfer authority to the courts.36
As the plot thickens, however, chapters nine and ten about polarization
and rot both come closest in Balkin’s generally disunified account to a
combined story of all three dynamics, with both polarization and rot
undermining the political supports for judicial review.37 Indeed, I found the
rot chapter the most compelling in the book because I take it to weaken the
ordinary expectations one might have (again, on Balkin’s own theory) of what
is likely to happen when the judiciary is dragged over the threshold of a new
cycle. Its breakdown in a time of polarization and, especially, its failures to
help counteract rot mean it may lack enough basic legitimacy for political
supports to be likely to return like magic once a comprehensive reset of the
dynamics has occurred.
I may be wrong about the case for internal self-refutation in Balkin’s
book. But I also have some independent doubts leading in the same direction.
It is significant that Balkin starts the second half of The Cycles of
Constitutional Time with a chapter about the endurance – indeed
intensification – of judicial review through history no matter what.38 But once
one places Balkin’s provincially American political science literature about
judicial review in its place, it is hard to fathom why the secular increase in
judicial power across time or the idea that politicians inevitably turn to
judiciaries to do their dirty work are anything like iron laws.

33. Id. at 69–80.
34. Id. at 74–77.
35. Id. at 10–11 (“[J]udicial review remains a desirable feature of
constitutional design.”).
36. Id. at 74–77
37. Id. at 112–147.
38. Id. at 69.
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For most of modern history outside America, the progressive consensus
was that transferring policy authority to judges, for all its uses, involved
greater risks, and was generally avoided.39 Even once America’s model
became hegemonic in its unipolar geopolitical moment around 1989, no one
acted to establish the extreme form of judicial review of our system. Balkin’s
cycles bake in all this provincialism outside the frame, I suspect simply
because Balkin is allowing his normative support for judicial review,
repeatedly expressed in his pages, to constrain our options in our distinctive
current moment.
This has a lot of consequences for Balkin’s nearly standalone chapter,
late in the book, on judicial reform.40 I have no quarrel, of course, with
Balkin’s advice “not to expect too much from courts, and endeavor to keep
them from doing too much harm” in the next few years.41 That a now
Trumpified judiciary is not going to provide the way out of polarization and
rot strikes me as quite right. But it by no means follows that we must and will
limit progressive engagement with the institutional power of courts to damage
control, before making them our instrument when the time is right. Neither
the obvious uses of doing so nor Balkin’s plea that “Americans should not
give up on judicial review” are conclusive.42
Balkin’s specific proposals for judicial reform – docket control, on the
one hand, and bench renewal plus term limitation, on the other – are striking
because they are almost entirely unrelated to the intellectual project of reading
the tea leaves of American regularities.43 Alteration in docket control has
been done on its own (or at least, without Balkin explaining where it fits in
his stories), while bench renewal plus term limitation has never been done
before.
In other words, even to the extent Balkin includes it in The Cycles of
Constitutional Time, court reform is independent of the processes the book is
about, past and future. And if that is true, one might ask, why not do other
things, especially with the current extraordinary coincidence of the brink of a
new regime with advanced polarization and rot? In any event, Balkin’s own
proposals are guided principally by the normative desire, at least as I read the
chapter, of de-dramatizing appointments battles. It is not just that there are
many other plausible normative goals to shape court reform, but that no
coming concatenation of causal factors in American cycles could preempt the
need to compare and contrast them and do the right thing.44 If Democrats
39. Id. at 74.
40. Id. at 148–56.
41. Id. at 150–51.
42. Id. at 150.
43. Id. at 152–56.
44. Cf. Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Democratizing the Supreme
L.
REV.
___
51–71
(2021),
Court,
109
CAL.
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triumph and face down the Supreme Court, and then choose to stock it with
their jurists, it will have been one option among others – a choice that, even if
Balkin is proven right that they make it rather than altering judicial power,
will come not so much a predictive necessity as a choice with benefits and
risks that could have gone differently.

IV. HOPE AND OPTIMISM
When we scratch the surface, my suspicion is that Balkin has developed
the intellectual scheme of The Cycles of Constitutional Time in response to
short-term events – above all, Donald Trump’s presidency – to domesticate
the shock of the recent outcome and wrest optimism from a catastrophe that
no cyclical theory could ever explain. This is not a book that would have been
written before 2016, and it will come to be seen as a product of its time, a
clarifying but also confused attempt to reckon with genuine novelty by
diminishing it and salvaging from the latest American wreckage a modicum
of liberal hope. Perhaps the Trump presidency requires something else:
acknowledging more of its originality as a basis for a more radical optimism
instead.
Not that there is a neat alternative to cyclical histories in my kind of
progressive futurism, which – like most accounts of linear evolution – are
freighted themselves with profound ancient legacies in their own right. Those
who have long since given up religion but think of history as a forum of
opportunity indulge in one of Judeo-Christianity’s biggest contributions to
Western culture.45
As Heine understood, in hoping not for cyclical return but novel
“progress,” the expectation that the arc of the moral universe is bending
towards justice, people are caught up in profound neo-providentialist legacies
in modern thought. To endorse a plausible account of betterment, the task of
extricating ourselves from the premodern legacies so as to reconcile our
beliefs about history and institutions with our understanding of human
freedom is no easy matter. But then, a progressive understanding of time is
no less amenable to reconstruction in modern and secular terms than archaic
and ancient cyclicality, and in any event Balkin wants both things.
On their own, I am not so sure Balkin’s cycles justify the modestly
optimistic scenario the book champions as an alternative to outright despair.
One of the interesting features of Balkin’s rhetoric throughout his book is that
he assumes his readers are depressed, and might need the tonic of political
science to get out of bed; and he reassures them at each stage that while the
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3665032
[https://perma.cc/EPJ7-QFEL].
45. See, e.g., KARL LÖWITH, MEANING IN HISTORY: THE THEOLOGICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 19 (1949).
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current situation is bleak, there is no reason to give in to cynicism or
demobilization. Though courts may not save us from our circumstances, the
American nation has been here before and can both survive and thrive, if it
seizes the possibilities of the moment.
Even within the terms of his own argument, it is not clear how Balkin
can justify near term optimism. Donald Trump lost, but Joe Biden’s victory
most likely marks an attempted restoration rather than anything like
realignment, and there is no particular reason to believe that it will only take
“five to ten years” to get through the current impasse.46 Those on the left and
right who have been operating roughly within Balkin’s own assumptions, like
Ross Douthat and Corey Robin, are generally careful to note that the
availability of a new regime by no means guarantees it comes about in the
near term, instead of the dithering of late-cycle repetition.47 “We are in
transition,” Balkin observes.48 But you can be in a transition a long time.
And I am very sure that cycles fail to allow for a more grandiosely
utopian set of possibilities. In the end, my own frustration with Balkin’s
account is that he relies too heavily on naturalistic thinking, without seeking
opportunities for free action outside the terms of his reconstructed past. The
Cycles of Constitutional Time seems to curtail our grounds for hope without
enough warrant, and shut down reasonable demands for bigger alternatives to
our constitutional history – including the role it has accorded judicial review
– than Balkin seems to want.
Do not get me wrong: I love everything about Balkin’s book, for its
achievements in rethinking American’s constitutional past in wonderfully
compelling ways. I just bridle at the modesty of its predictions for the future,
which the past does not seem to require. But I would not bet on Balkin being
wrong either.

46. Balkin, supra note 6, at 12; see generally Scott Detrow & Asma Khalid,
Biden Wins Presidency, According to AP, Edging Trump in Turbulent Race, NPR,
(Nov. 7, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/07/928803493/biden-winspresidency-according-to-ap-edging-trump-in-turbulent-race
[https://perma.cc/VHS4-C2LT].
47. Ross Douthat, Trump, Sanders, and the Revolt Against Decadence, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 30, 2016) (observing “how hard it is for a decadent society to escape
the trap of repetition”); Corey Robin, The Politics Trump Makes, N+1, (Jan. 11,
2017) (stating Trump could “founder in disjunction”).
48. Balkin, supra note 6, at 7.
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